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Bias and Conditioning in Sequential
Medical TrialsCecilia Nardini and Jan Sprenger*yRandomized controlled trials are currently the gold standard within evidence-based med-
icine. Usually they are monitored for early signs of effectiveness or harm. However, ev-
idence from trials stopped early is often chargedwith bias toward implausibly large effects.
To our mind, this skeptical attitude is unfounded and caused by the failure to perform ap-
propriate conditioning in the statistical analysis of the evidence. We contend that condi-
tional hypothesis tests give a superior appreciation of the obtained evidence and signifi-
cantly improve the practice of sequential medical trials, while staying firmly rooted in
frequentist methodology.
1. Introduction. Randomized controlled trials ðRCTsÞ—trials where pa-
tients are randomly assigned to a treatment and a control group, while con-
trolling for possible confounders—are currently the gold standard within
evidence-based medicine ðWorrall 2007Þ. Usually they are conducted as
sequential trials allowing for monitoring for early signs of effectiveness or
harm.
In sequential trials, data are typically monitored as they accumulate. That
is, we have interim looks at the data, and we may decide to stop the trial be-
fore the planned sample size is reached. By terminating a trial when over-
whelming evidence for the effectiveness or harmfulness of a new drug is
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available, we can bound the prohibitive costs of a medical trial and protect
in-trial patients against receiving inferior treatments. Thus, monitoring con-
tributes to meeting ethical and epistemic requirements that clinical inves-
1054 CECILIA NARDINI AND JAN SPRENGERtigators are confronted with.
However, the early termination of sequential trials raises an important
ethical concern: Is it mandatory to stop a trial as soon as the new treatment
shows convincing signs of superiority? Or should the trial be continued in
order to achieve a result that would convince the wide medical community
of the superiority of the new treatment? On the one hand, the health of
actual patients must not be jeopardized by administering an inferior treat-
ment; on the other hand, establishing sound and univocal scientific conclu-
sions will facilitate an effective cure of future patients.
The issue is complicated by the fact that evidence from trials stopped
early is often met with skepticism in the medical literature: “RCTs stopped
early for benefit . . . show implausibly large treatment effects. . . . Clini-
cians should view the results of such trials with skepticism” ðMontori et al.
2005, 2203Þ. This standpoint is affirmed by the recent STOPIT-2 metastudy
where Bassler et al. ð2010, 1187Þ blame truncated RCTs for “appreciable
overestimates of effect.”
While we cannot adjudicate the far-reaching question about the ethi-
cal legitimacy of monitoring, we side with Worrall ð2008, 418Þ that “no in-
formed view of the ethical issues . . . can be adopted without first taking
an informed view of the evidential-epistemological ones.” In particular, we
think that the skeptical attitude about trials stopped early for benefit stems
from a fallacious statistical interpretation of such trials. These misinterpre-
tations are, to our mind, mainly caused by a lack of awareness about issues
in statistical methodology that also troubles other disciplines, such as eco-
nomics and psychology. Indeed, the two grand schools of statistical infer-
ence—Bayesian and frequentist inference—are in outright conflict about
how to plan and to evaluate a sequential trial.
Our essay takes the following route. First, we expose the arguments for
and against the presence of bias in early stopped trials and explain why this
problem is related to principled questions in statistical methodology ðsec. 2Þ.
Subsequently, we argue that the real problem is the use of unconditional
error assessments in sequential trials, rather than the often-invoked divide
between Bayesians and frequentists ðsec. 3Þ. Then we show that conditional
frequentist tests reconcile the need for valid postexperimental appraisal of
the evidence with the realities of the current regulatory framework in med-
icine and, in particular, with the implied preference for frequentist analysis
ðsec. 4Þ. Finally, we wrap up our results and sketch how a superior meth-
odological framework can improve the design and practice of sequential
trials and eventually lead to better decisions ðsec. 5Þ.This content downloaded from 
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2. The Assessment of Truncated Trials. The practice of stopping RCTs
early for benefit has been subject to severe epistemological criticism. Skep-
ticism surrounds the results of these trials, due to the fact that they show
SEQUENTIAL MEDICAL TRIALS 1055implausibly large treatment effects, relative to what the medical commu-
nity would be inclined to expect. In a review of 134 trials stopped early for
benefit, Montori et al. ð2005Þ point to an inverse correlation between sam-
ple size and treatment effect: the smaller the sample size achieved by the
trial at the moment of stopping, the larger the estimate it provided for the
effect. These findings are supported by a more recent study by Bassler et al.
ð2010Þ, where truncated trials report significantly higher effects than trials
that were not stopped early.
Some prominent cases seem to corroborate this skepticism. Mueller
et al. ð2007Þ report a case of two leukemia treatments where interim analy-
ses suggested a high relative risk reduction ð53% and 45%Þ in a particu-
lar chemotherapy regimen. However, that assessment had to be reversed
after completion of the trial. In the medical community, such cases fuel
mistrust toward anticipated claims of benefit and nourish the fear of pro-
moting a treatment that is actually less efficacious. Therefore, stopping a
trial early might lead to a result that the medical community does not trust,
canceling the epistemic and ethical benefits that monitoring possesses in
the long run.
However, not all methodologists share this pessimistic view on trials
stopped early. Goodman, Berry, and Wittes ð2010Þ observe that pronounced
effect size differences between truncated and completed trials are actually
predictable: highly efficacious treatments will naturally be more prone to
early termination for benefit. Hence, the observed difference in estimated
effect size is precisely what we should expect. Comparing truncated to com-
pleted trials amounts, as highlighted by Berry, Carlin, and Connor ð2010Þ,
to selecting the trials to be compared on the basis of their outcome.
In this context, prior knowledge or empirically based prior expectations
are highly relevant for sound decision making. Unfortunately, at present
they enter the final decisions only in a methodologically unsatisfactory ad
hoc way. This observation suggests that systematic use of Bayesian infer-
ence may address the problem. A Bayesian represents subjective uncer-
tainty by means of a prior probability distribution over the values of the
quantity of interest ðe.g., relative risk reductionÞ. By means of Bayes’s the-
orem, this distribution is updated to a posterior probability distribution that
synthesizes the observed evidence with the background knowledge.
In the Bayesian framework, implausibly large observed effects can be
balanced by prior expectations and lead to a more conservative conclusion
than in standard frequentist methodology. In particular, it can be explained
that truncated trials provide, ceteris paribus, less confidence than trials withThis content downloaded from 
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a comparable effect size that were completed ðGoodman 2007Þ. The
smaller the actual sample, the more will the posterior distribution resem-
ble the prior distribution, for a given effect size. So it appears that the wor-
1056 CECILIA NARDINI AND JAN SPRENGERries of Montori et al. ð2005Þ and Bassler et al. ð2010Þ—overestimation of
treatment effect in truncated RCTs—could be alleviated by switching the
statistical framework.
Despite the advantages just outlined, there are some serious counter-
arguments to the viability of Bayesianism in clinical trials. First of all, the
specification of a prior probability function ðand a decision modelÞ is prob-
lematic in a number of ways ðseeMoyé 2008Þ. Second, in Bayesian statistics,
experimental design is apparently irrelevant for the postexperimental con-
clusions. This is unacceptable to regulatory bodies that are keen to promote
proper design of medical trials as a means to ensure the validity of trial re-
sults ðe.g., Food and Drug Administration 2010Þ.
Even though some of these worries are regulatory rather than epistemo-
logical, they are certainly legitimate. Indeed, we believe that solving the in-
terpretational problems with truncated trials does not require one to pass
from the frequentist to the Bayesian paradigm. As we will argue in the up-
coming sections, it is more fruitful to turn to a different distinction: namely,
to replace unconditional by conditional procedures.
3. Problems with Unconditional Inference in Sequential Medical
Trials. Sequential medical trials usually control the reliability of a testing
procedure from a preexperimental point of view, by means of type I and
type II error rates. These error probabilities are extremely important for
proper experimental design, and they get a lot of attention from a regula-
tory point of view. Moreover, Mayo and Kruse ð2001Þ have argued, among
others, that if the sampling plan is violated, error probabilities cannot be
properly controlled and are actually inflated far beyond acceptable.
However, adherence to a proper sequential sampling plan is not suffi-
cient to secure a reliable result. Arguably, what is most disturbing to the
medical community is the fact that, according to current procedures, a trun-
cated trial has prima facie the same reliability as a trial carried to the planned
end. This is because Neyman and Pearson’s type I and II error rates are un-
conditional quantities; that is, they are insensitive to whether the data are
just at the significance boundary or far beyond it.
In line with this observation, we contend that the unconditional nature
of Neyman-Pearson hypothesis tests is the culprit for their epistemological
shortcomings. To motivate this claim, we walk the reader through an exam-
ple by Cox ð1958Þ and Royall ð1997, 74–75Þ. Suppose that we test H0:N
ð0; j2Þ against H1:Nð1; j2Þ with known j2 and that the toss of a fair coin
decides whether we draw N 5 1 or N 5 100 independently and identically
distributed observations. It seems natural to apply the most powerful test atThis content downloaded from 
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the 5% level in either case. However, the probabilistic mixture of the two
most powerful tests at the 5% level is not the most powerful test in
the overall experiment. We can do better if we reject H for x > 1:282 in
SEQUENTIAL MEDICAL TRIALS 10570 1
the case of N 5 1, while rejecting H0 if x > 0:508 in the case of N 5 100.
Both procedures are tests at the 5% level, but the second, “gerrymandered”
test has a greater power ð69%Þ than the mixture of unconditional tests ð63%Þ.
One may be inclined to dismiss the second test because not all of its
components are tests at the 5% level. In the N 5 1 case, the nominal signif-
icance level of the test is 10%. However, from an unconditionalist ðpre-
experimentalÞ viewpoint, only the overall error rates should count. Here, the
superior power features speak for the second, gerrymandered test. This fea-
ture of the prevalent Neyman-Pearson methodology reveals the tension be-
tween the preexperimental design of unconditional procedures and the need
to efficiently learn from the actual data. Unconditional error rates and con-
fidence intervals do not address that second goal: “Now if the object of the
analysis is to make statements by a rule with certain specified long-run
properties, the unconditional test . . . is in order. . . . If, however, our objective
is to say what we can learn from the data we have, the unconditional test
is surely no good” ðCox 1958, 360Þ. The example can, of course, be easily
generalized. It undermines the view that unconditional, preexperimental er-
ror probabilities can qualify the goodness of an inference.
Therefore, practitioners who rely on unconditional procedures have to find
informative and reliable postdata assessments of the evidence. Often, they
report the observed p-value to quantify the conclusiveness of the rejection of
the null. However, p-values really combine the worst of all worlds. Since
comprehensive and devastating criticisms of using p-values in scientific ex-
periments have been delivered elsewhere ðRoyall 1997; Goodman 1999Þ;
we only mention their most fundamental failures: they neither possess a
valid frequency interpretation nor do they provide a useful measure of con-
fidence in the null hypothesis.
Moving to confidence intervals is often suggested as a way of circum-
venting the p-value problem ðe.g., Cumming and Finch 2005Þ. However,
a 95% confidence interval merely specifies the set of parameter values that
are consistent with the observation at the 95% level. This does not mean
that we should have 95% confidence that the confidence interval includes
the parameter value. In fact, the degree of confidence is just an average cov-
erage rate over intervals from repeated random samples; it is not the cover-
age probability of the one particular interval that the investigator happens
to get. Therefore, some confidence intervals may include the entire sample
space ðsee Seidenfeld 1981Þ, raising the question of whether the entire no-
tion is a misnomer.
These problems of unconditional inference can be overcome by condi-
tioning on the relevant chunks of information. In the next section, we willThis content downloaded from 
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see how conditional inference may resolve the methodological confusion
about interpreting truncated RCTs without abandoning the framework of
frequentist statistics.
1058 CECILIA NARDINI AND JAN SPRENGER4. Conditional Frequentist Inference. Conditional inference tries to im-
prove upon unconditional procedures by quantifying the degree of confidence
that we can have in our conclusions as a function of the observed evidence.
More precisely, conditional inference builds on the strength of the observed
evidence. As we will show in this section, it can be justified from both the
Bayesian and the frequentist perspective. The idea comes up for the first
time in Cox’s ð1958Þ seminal paper and has been developed later by Kiefer
ð1977Þ and Berger ð2003Þ, together with various coauthors.
The main idea can be motivated by a very simple example ðKiefer 1977;
Berger 2003Þ. Two observations X1 and X2 are taken with probability law
Xi 5
v1 1 with probability 1=2
v2 1 with probability 1=2

:
If we now construct a confidence interval for v, then the interval Cvð;Þ
defined by
CvðX1; X2Þ:5 X1 1 1 if X1 5 X2ðX1 1 X2Þ=2 if X1 ≠ X2

has an unconditional coverage of 75%. Yet this does not seem to be a sensi-
ble conclusion regarding the confidence that the data warrant with respect
to the true value of v. Dependent on whether we observe jX1 2 X2j5 0 or
jX1 2 X2j5 2, we are entitled to a statement with ða posterioriÞ confidence
50% and 100%, respectively. The unconditional coverage of 75% neglects
that, after learning the strength of the evidence ði.e., the value of jX1 2 X2jÞ,
we are in a much better position to assess the confidence which the data
grant about our inference. Thus, conditioning on the value of jX1 2 X2j im-
proves the accuracy of our conclusions ðsee Cox 1958, 361–63Þ.
It is also noteworthy that the probability distribution of jX1 2 X2j does
not depend on the value of v. That is, jX1 2 X2j is an ancillary statistic with
regard to v. In particular, conditioning on the value of jX1 2 X2j is quite
different from Bayesian conditionalization: where Bayesians change their
subjective probability distributions by conditioning on the entire data, con-
ditioning on the value of jX1 2 X2j just helps to better appreciate the ðfre-
quentistÞ interpretation of the data.
If this idea is applied to hypothesis testing, which is the major issue in
medical trials, unconditional error rates are replaced by conditional error
probabilities. In the following, we will outline the basic idea of conditional
tests, following Berger, Brown, and Wolpert ð1994Þ.This content downloaded from 
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Consider, for the purpose of mathematical convenience, the case of
testing a point null hypothesis H0: v5 v0 against the simple alternative
H : v5 v in some probability model ðX BðXÞ; v ∈ VÞ. Define f ðxÞ and
SEQUENTIAL MEDICAL TRIALS 10591 1 0
f1ðxÞ as the probability densities of data x ∈ X under the hypotheses H0
andH1, and let the Bayes factor BðxÞ:5 f0ðxÞ=f1ðxÞ be the ratio of the prob-
ability density functions. Now, let F0 and F1 be the cumulative distribu-
tion functions corresponding to the Bayes Factor.
F0ðcÞ:5 PH0ðBðX Þ ≤ cÞ F1ðcÞ:5 PH1ðBðX Þ ≤ cÞ:
We now divide X into a partition ðX sÞs∈½0;1 defined by
X s:5 fx ∈ XjBðxÞ5 s ∨ BðxÞ5 F210 ð12 F1ðsÞÞg: ð1Þ
The differentX s represent, intuitively, different observed strengths of ev-
idence. This can also be made precise mathematically: under the assump-
tion F0ð1Þ5 12 F1ð1Þ, which is satisfied for many distributions used in
practice, the X s have the same probability density under H0 and H1, for all
values of s. In other words, their distribution is independent of which hy-
pothesis is true ðBerger et al. 1994, 1789–90Þ.
This ancillarity property is shared with the statistic jX1 2 X2j in the above
toy example. Therefore, X s is excellently suited for the purpose of condi-
tioning: to take the observed strength of the evidence into account without
already telling us something about the parameter of interest. Thus, condi-
tioning exploits a crucial strength of Bayesian paradigm—to identify a sen-
sible measure of evidence—without assigning a subjective probability to
competing hypotheses.
The conditional error probability can now be calculated by conditioning
on the particular set X s in which the observed data fall. In particular, we can
define a conditional frequentist test by
T *ðX Þ5 reject H0 if BðX Þ < 1
accept H0 if BðX Þ ≥ 1

; ð2Þ
and for observed BðxÞ5 s, we report conditional error probabilities
aðsÞ5 PH0ðreject H0 j X ∈ X sÞ5
s
11 s
; ð3Þ
bðsÞ5 PH1ðaccept H0jX ∈ X sÞ5
1
11 s
; ð4Þ
where the latter equalities have been proven by Berger et al. ð1994, theo-
rem 1Þ. Clearly, by using the conditional instead of the unconditional errorThis content downloaded from 
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probabilities, we gain a much better appreciation of the chance of a wrong
decision, given the particular data that we have observed. The higher the
Bayes factor, the more confident we can be about an acceptance of the null
1060 CECILIA NARDINI AND JAN SPRENGERand vice versa. In particular, the classical, unconditional test just detects
whether the data are within or outside the rejection region ðand leaves the
rest to the notorious p-valuesÞ whereas the conditional test allows for a fine-
grained, properly frequentist discrimination among trials with significant
outcomes.
We turn now to briefly discussing a couple of objections that could be
made from within the frequentist perspective. First, it could be argued that
T * makes it far too easy to reject the null ðBðX Þ < 1Þ whereas in medicine,
evidence has to be really strong before we are convinced of the efficacy of
a new treatment and approve of the drug. To this we simply respond that T *
has been selected because of its simplicity, but we can easily change the
rejection region according to contextual requirements. To obtain a sensible
conditional test, we will often have to use nonancillary conditioning statis-
tics and to include a no-decision region ðBerger, Boukai, and Wang 1997,
145–47Þ. However, these features align well with the caution toward pre-
mature conclusions that prevails in the medical community and do not pose
any problem for the practitioner.
Second, there may be worries about the scope of the above procedure,
which we have only explained for the easiest possible case of hypothesis
testing. However, Berger et al. ð1997Þ have extended conditional tests to
simple versus composite testing problems and, in particular, to the two-
sided null hypothesis testing problems that frequently occur in RCTs.
Third, the use of the Bayes factor may indicate that the conditional test is
actually a Bayesian test in frequentist cloths. Indeed, for impartial priors
pðH0Þ5 pðH1Þ5 1=2 the posteriors
pðH0jxÞ5 11 BðxÞ21
 21
5
BðxÞ
11 BðxÞ ;
pðH1jxÞ5 11 BðxÞ½ 21 5 111 BðxÞ
just correspond to the conditional error probabilities for rejecting and ac-
cepting H0, respectively. However, BðX Þ possesses a frequentist interpre-
tation, too, since it identifies the most powerful frequentist test in the simple
versus simple testing problem.1
1. This is the content of the Neyman-Pearson lemma. Furthermore, Berger ð2003Þ
introduced a conditional test that relies on the p-value as the conditioning statistics and
yields the same postdata error probabilities as T *.This content downloaded from 
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Thus, Bayesians and frequentists can conduct the same ðconditionalÞ test
and obtain the same numerical conclusions. For the medical practitioner,
philosophical questions about the interpretation of probability are clearly
SEQUENTIAL MEDICAL TRIALS 1061secondary as long as there is methodological agreement on procedures and
postexperimental data assessment ðsee Berger 2003Þ. In this sense, condi-
tional inference is a genuine reconciliation of Bayesian and frequentist
methodology and a real asset for practitioners.
We would like to conclude this section by means of an application of
conditional inference to sequential medical trials. The example involves a
trial for adjuvant therapy in resectable hepatocellular carcinoma ðLau et al.
1999Þ. The trial was stopped early based on interim findings, but additional
data were available after the decision to stop was made. Pocock and White
ð1999Þ describe the situation in detail:
At the planned interim analysis, the local disease recurrence rates for the
active treatment ðintra-arterial lipiodol-iodine-131Þ and control ðno ad-
juvant treatmentÞ groups were three/14 ð21%Þ and 11/16 ð69%Þ respec-Such
anal
rand
quentively ðp5 0:01Þ. According to the predefined stopping rule, p < 0:029
was sufficient for early stopping. . . . Thus, the investigators decided to
stop the trial. ½However, 13 more patients were randomised before the
trial was stopped, and the investigators also decided to postpone analysis
while patients already randomised were followed up. Hence, the report
ð18 months after the trial was stoppedÞ reveals updated recurrence rates of
six /21 ð29%Þ and 13/22 ð59%Þ, respectively ðp5 0:04Þ. Thus the ab-
solute difference in recurrence rates shrank from 48% to 30% during the
interval between stoppage and publication. ð1999, 944Þ
shrinkage of the estimated benefit between the interim and the final
ysis is precisely what fuels clinicians’ worries about “stopping on a
om high” and adds to their skepticism about truncated trials. In thissituation conditional error rates can provide real guidance. We set up an
alternative hypothesis H1 according to Lau et al.’s ð1999Þ expectations that
“131I-lipiodol would reduce the rate of recurrence ½postulated to be 50%
by 50% and double the disease-free survival rate” ð1999, 798Þ.
Using this value in calculation of the Bayes factor BðxÞ5 0:09 yields a
conditional type I error rate of a* 5 9% at the interim analysis, instead of
the unconditional error rate of a5 5%.2 Moreover, we can dismiss the
apparently strong unconditional p-value of p5 :01%, which is just indic-
ative of an unexpectedly high performance. By contrast, the conditional
error reflects the greater statistical uncertainty associated with the small
2. Since the trial was stopped following a proper group sequential rule, a remains the
same regardless of when the trial is terminated, unlike in Wald’s ð1947Þ classical se-tial probability ratio test.
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sample when the decision to stop the trial was made. At the end of the trial,
the conditional test still rejects the null, but the probability of error is now
higher: the calculation based on BðxÞ5 0:16 yields a 14% probability of
1062 CECILIA NARDINI AND JAN SPRENGERerror, which is in line with the reservations of the clinicians involved.
We now briefly wrap up the advantages of conditional over unconditional
inference. First, the assessment of the error probability depends on the ob-
served data and is thus way more informative than in the unconditional
framework. This alleviates the interpretational problem mentioned in sec-
tion 2, since conditional error allows medical readers to assess the confidence
in the outcome based on the observed data. Clearly, medical investigators
should be more concerned with the actual probability of drawing the wrong
inference than with the absolute ðunconditionalÞ error rate of the testing pro-
cedure, also because clinicians have to make ethical decisions for their actual
patients ðsee Nardini 2013Þ.
As a further point, the error probabilities ð3Þ and ð4Þ are independent of the
stopping rule, that is the sampling plan determining when the trial is termi-
nated. In an RCT, the stopping rule can never be fully specified, since one
cannot cover in advance all eventualities that might happen during a se-
quential trial. Independence from the stopping rule entails that interpretation
of the results and assessment of error are possible even if the stopping rulewas
misspecified or could not be adhered to due to unforeseen circumstances. This
is a substantial practical asset ðsee Sprenger 2009Þ.
This should not be misunderstood as the claim that predata analysis and
experimental design are superfluous. Unfortunately, Berger et al. ð1994,
1803Þ make a claim in that direction, but given the strong emphasis on
careful design by methodologists and regulatory bodies ðsee Moyé 2008;
Food and Drug Administration 2010Þ, this is unlikely to increase the ac-
ceptance of the conditional approach among medical practitioners. We
would like to stress that no such claim is required for making a case for the
superiority of the conditional frequentist approach. Moreover, since con-
ditional tests can be conducted from both a Bayesian and a frequentist
perspective, practitioners do not have to decide for either camp.
Finally, there are interesting implications for the philosophy of statistics: if
the “error statisticians” ðe.g., Mayo 1996Þ are right that learning from error is
indeed a cornerstone of inductive inference, then a move to conditional in-
ference may protect their framework against the objections that we have
mentioned in section 3. In particular, there is no need to tie an error-statistical
methodology to unconditional inference. However, further developing this
line of thought goes beyond the scope of this article.
5. Conclusions. In this article, we have analyzed the impact of statistical
methodology on a substantive ethical and societal question, namely, dataThis content downloaded from 
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monitoring in sequential medical trials. In the medical literature, trials
stopped early for benefit are often charged with being biased toward im-
plausibly large treatment effects ðe.g., Bassler et al. 2010Þ.
SEQUENTIAL MEDICAL TRIALS 1063We think that this worry is based upon a misinterpretation of sequential
trials that is in turn due to shortcomings of standard frequentist procedures.
It has been argued ðe.g., Goodman 2007Þ that a Bayesian perspective over-
comes this problem: if a trial is stopped early because of an implausibly large
effect, blending its result with a ðconservativeÞ prior probability distribution
naturally mitigates the conclusion. However, as a matter of research tradition
and regulatory requirements—in particular, concerns about individual biases
in generating prior distributions—the Bayesian framework does not provide
an easy way out.
In this essay, we contend that the real issue is not the contrast between
Bayesian and frequentist methodology. Rather, we are concerned about the
shortcomings of unconditional inference. We have elaborated that while un-
conditional error probabilities may be helpful in the design of an experi-
ment, they do not tell uswhatwe have actually learned from the data.We have
therefore defended proper conditioning—calculating error probabilities con-
ditional on the strength of the observed evidence—as a way of curing the
deficits of unconditional frequentist inference. This approach has a natural
application to sequential testing and both a valid Bayesian and a valid fre-
quentist interpretation.
As we have demonstrated in a brief example, this approach holds con-
siderable promise for the interpretation of early stopped trials in medicine.
The possibility of postdata assessments of the probability of an erroneous
conclusion represents an invaluable asset for the practitioner and the de-
cision maker. The results of a medical trial tell much more than the simple
acceptance or rejection of a scientific hypothesis: they indicate where evi-
dence is strong and where it is inconclusive, indicating the need for further
research. Conditional inference, we believe, can improve the methodology
of clinical trials because it allows us to take this additional information into
account. In conclusion, a clearer view on issues in statistical methodology
can help to better appreciate data from sequential medical trials and lead to
more efficient and ethically superior decisions in medical research.
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